Reflected XSS via File Upload on Sony
Hi,
This is my first writeup! I discovered a reflected XSS vulnerability via the file upload feature on a Sony subdomain. This vulnerability allowed JavaScript payloads to be executed through a crafted file upload, posing serious risks such as session hijacking and unauthorized actions.
Main application(target):
https://*.*.*.sony.com/#/PATH1/PATH2
How I Found the Subdomain
I used the Project Discovery Chaos database (https://chaos.projectdiscovery.io/) to enumerate Sony subdomains. To identify live and responsive subdomains, I filtered the results using the httpx-toolkit
as follows:
Initial filtering to find alive hosts:
httpx-toolkit - silent
Further filtering to keep only HTTP 200 OK responses:
httpx-toolkit --silent -sc | grep 200
This process helped me identify a live Sony subdomain hosting the vulnerable application where I performed the file upload test.
Vulnerable Endpoint
Once a file is uploaded through the form, it becomes publicly accessible:
https://*.*.*.sony.com/uploads/PATH1/bnUnlZzw_js_injected_xss.pdf
This file, when accessed, executes the injected script due to improper output encoding.
XSS Payload File
You can view the crafted XSS payload file used in this test at:
👉 https://dr34m14.github.io/dr34m14/payloads/js_injected_xss.pdf
Reproduction Steps
- Go to:
https://*.*.*.sony.com/#/PATH1/PATH2
- Complete all required form fields.
- Click Continue to proceed.
- Upload the crafted PDF:
js_injected_xss.pdf
- 5.Retrieve the public URL of the uploaded file.
- Share the link with a target — the payload will trigger upon visiting.
Proof of Concept
Payload Location
The XSS was triggered by unsafe reflection of user-supplied input (e.g., filename or metadata) in the server’s response. The content was served directly in a way that allowed the injected script to execute.
Impact
- Reflected XSS on a Sony-owned subdomain
- Payload executes from the uploaded file’s URL
- Could lead to:
- Account takeover via session theft
- Phishing attacks
- Unauthorized actions in the context of the victim’s session
Reward
Sony acknowledged the issue and sent me swags as a thank-you.
Thanks for reading! This is my first writeup and I hope it helps raise awareness about secure file handling. Stay safe and happy bug hunting!
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